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Katelyn Ferral: On the Brink:  
Viktor Yanukovych’s Decisions and the Ukrainian Retreat From Europe 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
This thesis examines and explains the decision-making process and reasons 
behind former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s rejection of an Association 
Agreement with the European Union, more than four years in the making. Yanukovych 
was pressured by Russia both politically and economically to turn away from Europe and 
instead grow closer to the Kremlin. Ukraine’s desperate economy on the verge of 
bankruptcy, and Yanukovch’s political ties to Russia made him more vulnerable to 
blackmail. To help explain why Yanukovych spurned the deal, which ultimately led to 
mass protests and his ousting in 2013, this thesis draws upon interviews, government and 
academic research reports and news articles. The EU’s structural and institutional 
weakness in its foreign policy towards its Eastern neighbors also hindered its ability to 
gain a geopolitical edge in incentivizing Ukraine to modernize and reform, and ultimately 
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Ukrainians protested through many wintery weeks of cold in Kiev’s Maiden Square, 
fighting for something many Europeans blame for various misfortunes: membership and closer 
ties with the EU. After four years of negotiations, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s 
decision to walk away from a closer trade deal with the EU last November has highlighted the 
country’s political, regional, historical and ideological divisions and spurred the largest show of 
discontent since the Orange Revolution in 2004. Yanukovych’s pivot away from the largest 
economy in the world widened political schisms in the country and, along with Russian media 
influences, stoked tensions between the East and West based on identity -- between those who 
see themselves more a part of Russia and those who see themselves as more nationalistically 
Ukrainian and a part of Europe. Caught between Eastern and Western alliances, Ukraine is 
poised to make major decisions about its future. On the Eastern frontier of the EU, Ukraine is a 
key player in the geopolitical dynamic in Europe. Ukraine’s future matters. Its decisions and 
struggling economy have broad implications for stability across Eastern Europe. It also remains a 
major energy transit country for the Western half of the continent and its economy; with 
infrastructure reforms it has the potential to be a major geopolitical player.  
 This thesis explores the cost/benefit calculations of the Yanukovych government as it 
moved towards signing the trade agreement with the EU, and how they changed over time.  What 
were the chief factors driving the government towards signing the agreement – and what were 
the factors that ultimately caused Yanukovych to walk away from it? Why did he initial the 
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agreement, and work years to make changes, only to reject it?   And why did Yanukovych, 
largely seen as representing pro-Russian Ukrainians in the East, work so long and get to close to 
signing an agreement with Brussels in the first place? This thesis argues that Yanukovych was 
heavily influenced and pressured by Russia, and in dire need of emergency funds to keep the 
economy afloat, both of which led him to ultimately reject the Association Agreement with the 
EU and all the stipulations and reforms that it required. I argue that two factors were the main 
drivers of Yanukovych’s decision to reject the EU Association Agreement in November 2013: 
First, the country’s failing economy, on the brink of bankruptcy.  Second, is the influence of 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who used Yanukovych as a geopolitical puppet in steering 
Ukraine away from the European Union. Yanukovych’s susceptibility to Putin’s influence was 
amplified by a time-frame expectations gap within the Brussels-Kiev-Moscow relationship 
triangle. By this gap, I mean the difference in how quickly Ukraine hoped for financial aid and 
how quickly Brussels would potentially deliver it, versus how quickly the Russians could. The 
very nature of the EU-- a multi-level democratic institution of pooled member-state sovereignty 
with many moving parts -- renders it incapable of rapidly pushing through a specific agenda. 
Russia, conversely, as it becomes ever more undemocratic over the course of the reign of 
Vladimir Putin, can move quicker since political power is lies in the executive, concentrated in 
his hands. The economic conditions of the country and the rampant political corruption in the 
Yanukovych administration reaching into all levels of the state also made Yanukovych more 
vulnerable to Putin’s demands and played a role in his rejection of closer ties with the EU.  
The theoretical literature on the EU’s relations with neighboring states provides insights 
into what Ukraine stands to gain from closer relations with the EU, and how that agreement fits 
with the country’s long-term prospects for EU membership. The EU has so far refused to give 
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Ukraine a EU membership offer.  Has the internal debate and protest in Ukraine been mainly 
about the trade agreement with the EU?  Or has it been about something broader – a choice of 
civilizations between the West and Moscow, reflecting Ukraine’s own convulsed history? The 
academic literature also unpacks to how the geopolitics of the European Neighborhood Policy – 
and being kept out of the EU membership queue -- has affected the Ukrainian state and its 
progress on democratic reforms following communism.  
To support my argument about Yanukovych’s cost-benefit calculations of Ukraine 
signing the EU’s trade deal, I use firsthand interviews, newspaper articles, government reports, 
trade agreements, and speeches and documents that represent the positions of the EU, of the 
Ukrainian government, and of Ukrainian opposition political groups. A background section will 
also include primary source interviews with those who did participate in the Kiev protests, 
potentially along with other young professionals and academics in Ukraine.   
 This thesis is organized in four parts. The first part examines the development of 
Ukrainian state after the end communism. It sketches the divide in Ukraine between people who 
look East and those who look West, and helps explain how this contributes to ongoing tension 
political tension and division. The second part connects the relevant literature on the shortfalls of 
the EU’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, the Eastern Neighborhood Policy and the EU’s policy 
of enlargement to its lapse in Ukraine failing to sign the Association Agreement in November 
2013. My argument builds upon the theories that unpack the shortfalls of the EU’s Eastern 
Neighborhood Policy to help explain its more recent shortcomings in dealing with Ukraine. This 
literature explaining the ENP and why its effectiveness has been limited will help in 
understanding why the EU was ultimately unable to succeed in securing Yanukovych’s signature 
on the Association Agreement.  This section also includes an analysis of how identity theory and 
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politics help illuminate the situation in Ukraine today, after Yanukovych’s government rejected 
the EU Association Agreement. The third part provides evidence for my argument that the EU 
deal was rejected for two main reasons:  Yanukovych’s corrupt, Russian-influenced regime, 
which included oligarchs and political elites receiving strong support from Russia and plundering 
Ukrainian industries and government money, and the weak state of Ukraine’s economy. This 
evidence includes firsthand interviews, polling data, government reports and speeches from 
Moscow, Brussels and Kiev and news articles that have catalogued the events and negotiations 
leading to the deal and the fallout since its destruction. The fourth part examines my evidence in 
light of my hypothesis. Then I will discuss the implications of Ukraine’s crisis and 




Ukraine’s Government Regime Since 1989 
Ukraine has a complex history. Its political changes and upheaval over the last several 
decades, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has shaped its economy and its 
domestic political system and its place in the European geopolitical map today. Understanding 
the past and the political and ethnic complexities that have shaped Ukraine is crucial to 
understanding Ukraine-Russian-European Union relations today, and Ukraine’s journey towards 
and away from an Association Agreement with the EU. This section helps in explaining the 
political environment that helped create the Yanukovych administration and shaped his interests 
in dealing with Russia and the Brussels. 
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Ukraine became formally independent in 1990 with the Declaration of State Sovereignty 
of Ukraine.  Scholars describe its separation from the Soviet Union in 1991, as a more 
evolutionary course than a watershed revolutionary moment.1 An overwhelming majority of 
Ukrainians, even ethnic Russians voted to declare independence.2The state has historically been 
tolerant and open to its many minorities. First Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk won praise 
for striving for a civic concept of citizenship instead of an ethnic one.3  Ukraine’s first Soviet 
constitution remained in effect until 1996, until a new one was created. The new constitution still 
had a Soviet framework and was developed with Soviet methods, bringing its neutrality into 
question.4 The country’s institutions and practices were also modeled on the Soviet style, which 
affected which actors could be involved in its creation, a contrast to other post-Communist 
countries who used a roundtable approach to open up the political process and start anew.5 
Members of the Verkhovna Rada (or Supreme Council) also stayed in office during this 
transition until 1994, shaping the transition process and obstructing reform.6 The elite were never 
ejected from power, and the absence of strong competition in the political system contributed to 
the low quality of democracy in Ukraine today.7 
Kravchuk aimed to recreate a smaller version of the Soviet economy instead of a free 
market and instead of a true market. During his time in office, as a result of USSR dissolution 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 D'Anieri, P. (2006). Understanding ukrainian politics: Power, politics, and institutional design. London: M.E. Sharpe. Pgs. 
74,75 
 
2 Pond, E. (1999). The rebirth of europe. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. pg 143 
 
3 Pond, 2000 pgs 143 
 
4 D’Anieri, 2006, pgs 79  
 
5 Pond, 2000, pgs 144 
 
6 Pond, 2000, pgs 144 
 
7 Vachudova, 2005, pgs 37,38 
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and economic mismanagement gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 50 percent.8 The 
Soviet form of government that the Ukrainian one was based from concentrates power in the 
Communist Party, creating a monopoly without a system of checks and balances. There were 
judicial, legislative and executive branches on paper, but no real separation of powers.9 
In 1994 Leonid Kuchma was elected democratically, but further entrenched authoritarian 
practices in government.  As one scholar put it, “the puzzle is not just that Ukraine became 
authoritarian, but that it did so after the democratic elections of 1994.”10 The puzzle being that 
democratic processes do not necessarily beget democracy. A few factors remain consistent in 
Ukrainian politics in the two plus decades since independence. Turnover of political elites is rare, 
and there is substantial institutional continuity from Soviet times despite alternation in the posts 
of prime minister and president.  Kuchma passed the Law of Power in 1995 and in 1996 through 
threatening parliament by holding a referendum; he fundamentally changed the way the country 
functioned on a federal level. He redistributed power in the federal government, and gave the 
president more power, subordinating the cabinet to the executive branch. Ukraine’s inefficient 
and rough transition out of Sovietization and a state controlled economy, led to an opaque 
privatization process, which resulted in oligarchs taking control of the economy and all of its 
major industries in the 1990’s and early 2000s. Substantive economic reform was stagnant and 
GDP per capita dropped below $650 from 1997-1999.11 In his early years in office, Kuchma 
made some modest economic reforms to stabilize the economy, but resisted to follow the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Wilson, A. (2013). Pathways to freedom chapter review: Ukraine political and economic lessons from democratic 




9 D’Anieri, 2006, pgs 81 
 
10 D’Anieri, 206, pgs 81 
 
11 Wilson, 2013, pgs 2-6 !
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path to reform and economic prosperity as Poland. 12 Ukraine also struggled to produce a new 
generation of young leaders and political elites to push forward with change. “Ukraine never had 
the ‘bench depth’ of successive sophisticated Polish finance ministers and economists … There 
was no pack of hot-shot reformers in Ukraine with an education in basic market economics.”13 
Kuchma won reelection in 1999, and appointed Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister, 
tasking him to reform an economy, which continued to struggle. Most of Kuchma’s senior 
political appointees came from Dnipropetrovsk, an Eastern regional political clan with 
historically closer allegiances to Russia.  Yanukovych’s reforms worked to some degree, but also 
further enriched the oligarchs.  Political elites in a position to cash in on the new commerce that 
the reforms allowed focused their attention on short-term personal enrichment, at the expense of 
investing in domestic infrastructure, and doing the necessary state building that was necessary.14 
The Constitution was amended after the Orange Revolution in 2004, which was spurred by a 
rigged presidential election. Hundreds of thousands of people marched in Kiev for two months, 
and Kuchma’s former head of the central bank-turned-opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was 
elected to spearhead reform. Constitutional reforms stemming from the Orange Revolution 
shifted power from the president to the parliament. But the Orange Revolution did not 
fundamentally change the country’s political infrastructure; it just switched elites at the top. 
When Yuschenko was voted in by the more nationalist West, it allowed his opponent, 
Yanukovych to undermine and criticize the election’s legitimacy to his pro-Russian constituents 
in the East. 15 Lack of support and financial help from the West and the international community 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Pond, 2000, pgs 146 
 
13 Pond, 2000, pgs 147 !!
14 Pond, 2000, pg 148 
 
15 Wilson, 2013, pgs 2-6  
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also hampered the scope and impact of the Orange Revolution’s reforms, allowing Russia an 
opening to push its own agenda for the region. The changes that were made in 2004 were 
reversed in 2010 when Yanukovych ran again for the presidency and won in the elections that 
were mostly deemed reasonably free and fair.16  
A free, robust press is inextricably linked to democratic prosperity, and Ukraine lacks 
both. The absence of a free press along with a limited impact of the alternation of political elites 
further hampers the quality of domestic political competition in Ukraine. Media companies are 
controlled by political oligarchs and journalists still face bullying and bribery. Yanukovych’s 
hastily passed EuroMaidan laws that were swiftly repealed in early 2014 initially cracked down 
hard on journalists who question or criticize the government at all through their work. 
Natural gas in Ukraine is a critical, yet mostly untapped resource for the economically 
troubled country. Despite its own gas reserves, the country’s poor economic infrastructure, 
largely corrupt governance and lack of industrial development and structural reform has kept 
Ukraine highly dependence on Russia for its gas, making it even more vulnerable to external 
economic shocks. 17 
 
Geopolitical Identities in Ukraine 
Identity plays a central role in shaping Ukraine’s political history and its current national 
cleavages. Identity is important to consider when examining Yanukovych’s background, his 
supporters, and his relationship with Russia. The differences between Eastern and Western 




17 Central Intelligence Agency, (2014). The world factbook. Retrieved from website: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html 
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explain why Yanukovych rejected EU ties like he did. 
Identity, and all that constitutes it, is a key factor in the fundamental differences between 
Ukraine’s regions.  It is important in this thesis because identity influences and contributes to the 
schism between ethnic Russians and non-Russian Ukrainians and the politics they practice. 
Yanukovych’s Russian allegiance draws from his Eastern Ukrainian identity and support base. 
There are a variety of identities, many with a geopolitical dimension, competing for power in 
Ukraine. Though there are many political cleavages that align with these identities, the divide 
between East and West is often most prominent. This divide includes a more exclusivist 
Ukrainian nationalist identity dominant in the West and growing stronger in the capital, 
especially among the youth, and a post-Soviet Ukrainian identity shared by many in the East and 
South, an identity that feels closer to Russia.18 Identity could be a core driver of the absence of a 
common historical sense among Ukrainians, because the territory that is now Ukraine has 
changed hands so many times. The country brings together people with different backgrounds 
and different historical experiences. The degree of memory repression, or how large a role the 
past experiences play in current affairs and the public consciousness, each side feels seems to 
most greatly influence their views. The West was annexed by Russia much later and thus its 
experience was tinted with brutalization of conquest, while the East became the part of the 
Russian state much earlier and its early experience of annexation was largely one of settlement 
and colonization. However, students from either side went to schools that taught a completely 
different and one-sided pro-Soviet curriculum.19 “The memory of the repression is fresher in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Dietsch, Johan. Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture. Lund: Media Tryck, 
Lund University, 2006. 
 
19 Himka, John-Paul, Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian 
Historical Culture, and: Holod 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraini iak henotsyd/Golod 
1932–1933 gg. v Ukraine kak genotsid [The 1932–33 Famine in 
Ukraine as a Genocide]. 1949-Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 
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western Ukraine which affected it longer; an older, but still active generation there remembers 
what Stalinism was like. It is different in the eastern oblasts, where most people are products of 
the Soviet school. They were loyal to the authorities in contrast to their parents, and the Stalinist 
repressions did not affect them.” 20 
 
Ukrainian Divisions 
As Riabchuk explains, the cleavages in Ukraine run along religious, cultural, historical, 
remembrance, linguistic and ethnic lines. “Western Ukrainians have never internalized 
communism, never perceived the Soviet Union as "their own" country, and never believed that 
the Soviet Army had come to liberate them as it claimed but rather as the replacement of some 
other occupants.”21 Political differences between the East and West are striking as well as they 
both fight for exactly opposite things. Western Ukrainians are mostly anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet and believe Russia is their biggest threat, while America is their greatest ally and advocate 
a revival in the Ukrainian language and culture and eventual EU membership.22 Many in the 
East, especially ethnic Russians born in Ukraine do not want that.23  
One systemic issue that has led to these vast differences that has plagues post-Soviet 
rulers since Ukrainian independence is the lack of a founding national ideology or mantra.24 This 
lack of cohesion in ideology is tricky to track, because the two region’s development, in terms of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(8/3) Summer 2007 (Review) DOI: 10.1353/kri.2007.0037 
 
20 Himka, 2007, pgs!
 
21  Riabchuk, Mykola. Ukraine: One State, Two Countries? Eurozine. (2002 September 16). Retrieved from: 









its russification, then subsequent sovietization happened very gradually, region by region over 
the course of 300 years.25 A neo-functionalist theorist would have predicted that, like a row of 
dominos, each region would assimilate into each other, further integrating one aspect of society, 
then another, and another, until a unified singular Ukrainian state was produced. Clearly, this has 
not been the case. Instead, virtually two Ukraines, one "Soviet" and one "European", have been 
created, overlapped and fused. “They permeate each other so deeply that even in Lviv [in the 
West] one may find many remnants of sovietism, while in Donetsk [in the East] some signs of 
"Ukrainianness" and "Europeanness" may equally be discerned.”26  
There is a tension between a pro-independence approach and a pragmatist approach in 
Ukrainian politics that can help shed light on why Yanukovych got so close to signing a deep 
trade agreement with the EU and then walked away after years of negotiations and statements in 
support of closer cooperation. The pro-independence agenda advocates independence over 
everything, to end Ukrainian dependency on Russia and distance itself from Russia’s eastern 
European sphere of influence.27 The pragmatists focus on economic growth and prosperity for 
Ukraine, and argue that much of this hinges on closer cooperation and collaboration with Russia. 
The short- and long-term benefits of these approaches also play into the discrepancies between 
them. Ukrainian politics since its beginnings in 1991 typically swing back and forth between 





26 Riabchuk, 2002, pg 2 
 
27 Samokhvalov, V. (2007). Relations in the eu-russia-ukraine triangle: Zero-sum game or not?.European Institute for Security 
Studies-Occasional Paper,!http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ68.pdf!pgs!10@12!!
28 Samokhvalov, 2007, pgs 10, 11!
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Geopolitical Position Between Moscow and Brussels since 1991 Ukraine’s! geopolitical! position! between! Moscow! and! the! West! also! helps! us!understand! the! context! for! the! fact! that! Yanukovych! pursued! actively! a! EU! deal! before!walking!away! from! it.!  The country has long been characterized as a borderland between the 
East and West and the latest spat between the two powers show that this is clearly still the case.  
The literature argues that the ENP and EP have largely failed on two critical fronts: converting 
Russia into a believer of the EU’s signature normative democratic values through actual policy 
implementation and offering former Soviet states like Ukraine tangible incentives to move 
towards EU accession. Ukraine’s political cleavages make sustainable democratic system reform 
challenging, but regional alliances and parliamentary-type government could be established 
there, just has it’s been done in other multi-ethnic countries.  29  
Energy in the form of natural gas has been a key point of contestation between Moscow, 
Brussels and Kiev. Russia holds a great deal of the continent’s gas reserves. Ukraine is a transit 
country to veteran EU members like Germany and depends on the Russians and their prices as 
well. Ukraine has had gas-related and transit disputes with Russia nearly every decade since 
1990 when it became independent from the Soviet Union. After a two-week dispute that saw gas 
supplies cutoff to Europe, Ukraine agreed to 10-year gas supply and transit contracts with Russia 
in January 2009 that brought gas prices to "world" levels. The strict terms of the contracts have 
further hobbled Ukraine's cash-strapped state gas company, Naftogaz.30  
The ways in which Russia and the EU have collaborated have mostly centered on narrow 
objective-based policies. This is relevant to Ukraine because it reflects a lack of coordination on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 D’Anieri, 2006, pg 104 
 
30 Gow, D. (2009) Russia-ukraine gas crisis intensifies as all European supplies are cut off. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jan/07/gas-ukraine!
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broader geopolitical issues between the East and West and reinforces Ukraine’s historical 
position of straddling that East-West divide. The limited collaboration between Russian and the 
EU points to the fact that some geopolitical tensions remain, with competing European visions. 
These policies include visa regimes, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking, all of which affect 
broad interests like border security, fighting organized crime and counter-terrorism. The two 
have signed several security agreements, including several conventions on terrorism prevention. 
In 2008, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters in 2008, 
and in 2009 the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism.31 But when it comes to economic 
and governance models, the EU and Russia continue to work at odds with each other in separate, 
parallel spheres. Collaboration on these other security goals is crucial for the stability of the 
broader region. If cooperation stagnates, international crime could flourish, Olga Potemkina 
argues in her essay on EU-Russia security goals.32 But for the two powers to be successful in 
achieving their shared goals on these issues, a fundamental shift in mindset and approach will 
have to take place. Potemkina is right to argue for a more symmetrical relationship, built upon 
responsibility and mutual trust.  There has been significant progress in this direction, she argues, 
but it is still not enough.   
The EU and Russia have an extensive history of trade and security agreements post Cold 
War. In 1994 they signed a multifaceted Partnership Cooperation Agreement, which Russia 
argued did not benefit them because it included about 600 restrictions costing the country 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Potemkina, O. (2010) EU–Russia cooperation on the common space of 
freedom, security and justice – a challenge or an opportunity?, European Security, 19:4, 551-568, 
DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.498009, pg 562 
 
32 Potemkina, 2010, pgs 562-563 
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hundred millions dollars a year.33 Talks between Brussels and Moscow have made some 
economic and security progress in the past.34 These developments include an enhanced Early 
Warning Mechanism for energy disputes and the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, 
which created a platform for more cooperation across economic, trade, energy, and infrastructure 
platforms.35  Free trade between Russia and the EU was proposed in 1998 but quickly voted 
down. 36 Free trade, argues Shishkov, has a much greater likelihood of benefiting only the EU at 
Russia’s expense, which could explain Russia’s eagerness to assert their interests and power 
within such a deal. This argument is fitting, especially when looking at Russia’ trajectory, 
advocating for its own Customs Union, where it can direct trade with Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
now potentially Ukraine. 
Russia has at times been cooperative on energy agreements and some tenets of the 
Eastern Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, but other times, the country has been the 
biggest foil to the EU’s trademark normative strength and its attempts to expand and integrate 
former Soviet Republics.37  Russia’s level of security cooperation with Europe has followed a 
sort of  “two steps forward, one back” pattern, which can be seen through its lack of adherence 
on several key points of the EU’s CSDP and the EP and ENP. In pure realist fashion, Russia 
cooperates as an equal partner with the EU only when it directly benefits its own national 
interests. It then actively tries to convince Ukraine to do the same. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Pinder, J. Shishkov, Y. (2002). The EU and Russia, The Promise of Partnership. London.  The Federal Trust for Education and 
Research. 
 
34 Averre, D. (2010) The EU, Russia and the shared neighbourhood: security, governance and energy, European Security, 19:4, 
531-534, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.543023 
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After years of negotiations, meetings, and speeches to Ukrainian citizens back home and EU 
officials in Brussels, Yanukovych’s decision to walk away from an Association Agreement with 
the EU spurred a near revolution in a standoff between political opponents and the Yanukovych 
government with highly organized government protests in Kiev and cities throughout the country 
demanding the resignation of the government and immediate elections.  I argue that there are 
three competing explanations for why Yanukovych walked away from the agreement that was 
years in the making with the EU. The first is a combination of economic and political blackmail 
by Putin. The second competing theory is a lack of support from Yanukovych supporters in 
Eastern Ukraine. The third is that Yanukovych never intended to commit to further cooperation 
with Europe and only cared to advance his own political authority in Ukraine. In this thesis I 
argue that the first theory, and its associated longstanding factors were the major contributors to 
Ukraine’s ultimate rejection of the EU Association Agreement in November 2013: First, the 
country’s failing economy on the brink of bankruptcy.  Second, the influence of Russia on its 
pseudo puppet, President Viktor Yanukovych and the time frame expectations gap within the 
Brussels-Kiev-Moscow relationship triangle.” 
The first and probably most important factor that explains Yanukovych’s decision-
making process includes a combination of political and economic factors. Yanukovych was, as 
he claims, pressured and essentially blackmailed by Vladimir Putin with damaging trade 
sanctions and a significant gas price hike. The inconsistency between what the EU could offer 
and what Ukraine needed lies in the timeframe and its implications for the structure of costs and 
benefits of the EU versus Russia’s Customs Union. Ukraine had not met the requirements for the 
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International Monetary Fund loan and needed an influx of cash before the EU could deliver 
assistance. No loan to buoy the economy tripled with a sharp hike in gas prices and a trade 
embargo with its biggest current economic partner Russia would have, arguable hurt the country 
before it could make it to a “long-term” benefit scenario. In order to salvage the economy and 
not fiscally cripple his citizens, the costs of rejecting the EU were lower than the benefits of 
heeding Russia’s demands.  
The second theory, which is considerably less probable, is that some Ukraine citizens 
believe is that Yanukovych never intended to sign the agreement in the first place. This theory 
argues that the president has been essentially putting on a show in an effort to placate Brussels 
but had always remained steadfast in his pursuit of the Russian agenda for the country. He did 
not want Ukraine to move towards the EU, but wanted to remain relevant and perceived as self-
determined and sovereign on the European stage. This theory relies heavily on the relationship 
between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovych and posits that Yanukovych was only interested 
in getting quick money to keep the Ukrainian economy from bankruptcy, and played the EU in 
order to secure the loan and a fixed gas price and trade contract with Russia. 
The third alternate theory is the inability of Ukraine to meet EU requirements, in concert with 
public opinion and political elites in the Eastern part of the country that did not favor closer EU 
ties. In a political system that is largely driven by a few wealthy oligarchs at the top, 
Yanukovych may have been beholden to the group of officials that helped him reach power and 
the constituents from his region.  He may have been influenced by the leverage and opinions of 
the pro-Russian Ukrainians in the East and the pro-Russian oligarchs who control key industries 
like oil and gas and manufacturing in the country.  
! 17!
 The primary argument of this thesis is that Yanukovych ultimately rejected the 
Association Agreement with the EU because of political pressure from Russia and economic 
desperation for quick money to keep the country afloat. This argument and the events that 
support it in late 2013 show that Ukraine is an example of a failure of the EU’s ENP and 
highlights the EU’s limitations in inducing movements towards democracy without an 
enlargement incentive.  
 This thesis adds a new dimension to past analysis of the ENP by exploring the tension 
between the short-term and long-term time frame in the agenda of the EU as well as in the 
agendas of its neighboring states that are hopeful of obtaining a membership perspective.  In the 
case of Yanukovych’s about-face on the Association Agreement, the EU and Russia were 
thinking in terms of very different time horizons. The EU pushed forward with measures and aid 
incentivizing long-term benefits and gains to Ukraine, while Russia emphasized the short-term 
benefits and immediate costs of refusing their offer and instead taking the road to the west.  
And in this case, motivated by economic factors and Russian pressure, Yanukovych reasoned 
that he needed to keep Ukraine afloat financially in order to preserve his own political power. 
This gamble that ENP countries make, and the dynamic that forces them to choose one path and 
forego another is important to note among other countries in the Eastern neighborhood too. It 
would be prudent for the EU to consider the implications of the short and long term dichotomy 
and the significance of in its advocacy work and relationships with its other neighbors. It’s 
unclear whether the very nature of the EU, being a 28-member supranational state, and therefore 
steeped in complicated and long bureaucratic decision making makes it incapable of extending 
more short-term incentives and benefits to countries who are struggling to come into line with its 
normative values. Russia, by virtue of its less democratic and therefore more streamlined 
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approach, can more easily offer incentives and attempt to exert regional influence in a way it 
knows the EU fundamentally struggles to match. This time component applies to the ENP 
specifically but could be useful in an analysis of the CSDP broadly. 
Ukraine’s recent reversals in its relationship with the EU illustrate the salience of realism 
as a way to approach international relations and bandwagoning as a way to maximize benefits 
and minimize costs. Realist theory in international relations posits that countries will first and 
foremost seek their own security in order to maintain or attain sovereignty and power. Weaker 
states may then do this by bandwagoning off more powerful states, who can provide them with 
tangible benefits but demand little cost (at least in the short term). 38 Making decisions based on 
broad principles or values when those values do not have an immediate, concrete benefit is not 
practiced among IR realists. According to the measures of power described by both Stephen 
Walt and Kenneth Waltz, states with illegitimate leaders, weak governmental institutions, and/or 
little ability to mobilize economic resources are weak states are likely to bandwagon anyway.39 
Ukraine and the Association Agreement fit these qualifications nearly perfectly. “Bandwagoning 
involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the 
dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. . . . Bandwagoning is an accommodation to 
pressure (either latent or manifest) . . .. Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a 
willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally.”40 
Literature on the European Neighborhood Policy generally argues that it is significantly 
limited and has not been as comprehensive or as effective as hoped in inducing neighboring !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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countries to reform institutions and adopt EU rules in some sectors of society. Analyzed in the 
context of the EU’s enlargement process, the EU’s most successful and familiar foreign policy, 
the ENP does not fare well. As a de-facto, tweaked enlargement policy, essentially aimed at 
getting countries to jump on the EU’s signature normative values bandwagon, and then get on an 
entry ramp to membership candidate status, the ENP has been a failure.41  
In her landmark article on the approach and effectiveness of the EU’s European 
Neighborhood Policy, Judith Kelley traces the extent to which the ENP uses its enlargement 
process incentives and approaches to promote domestic reform within the countries along its 
Eastern frontier. Kelley highlights Ukraine in pointing out the limitations of the EU’s attempts at 
reform in its neighbors without the carrot of membership. Although Ukraine’s action plan was 
among the first of the ENP to be finalized in 2005, its trajectory has not followed the EU’s hopes 
or expectations. Through interviews with EU officials, she makes key distinctions between the 
ENP and enlargement process, but affirms that both are largely based on the same foundations.  
The ENP has grown and developed from the enlargement process, most notably in its 
focus on socialization and conditionality. The EU promotes socialization and conditionality by 
partnering with reform-minded domestic NGOs within ENP countries to socialize those groups 
towards EU values but also offers countries wider access to trading and economic integration to 
commensurate with domestic reforms. The EU also funds various domestic projects to develop 
civil society and aligns itself with reform-minded forces in the countries. Though methodological 
differences remain, there is path dependency and adaption from the EU’s enlargement 
experience. But non-member ENP countries are clearly a very different challenge in terms of 
both their starting points and their recent interactions with the EU. Thus, as much as the EU has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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policy. JCMS, 44(1), 29-55. !
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to offer its neighboring states, the absence of the membership incentives for most countries 
should require significant adjustment, not just adaptation, of the enlargement strategy. The 
available policy tools are weaker, while the tasks in terms of political reforms are more 
demanding. 42 
Several analyses of the ENP also agree that ENP diminishes EU as any kind of 
significant normative influence in the Eastern area. Through their research, Silander and Nilsson 
refute the idea that the EU should be considered a normative power. The ENP has extended or 
enhanced the EU as a normative power on its own continent. Although the EU enlargement 
process has been considered the most successful EU foreign in its history. (Dannreuther 2006, 
Bosse 2009, p. 215), the subsequent Eastern Neighborhood Policy has largely failed in its major 
objectives in making neighboring countries more democratic. This has significantly hindered the 
EU’s development as a normative power on it’s own continent. It’s unclear the role Russia has 
had in the trajectories of these states.43 
There are other more specific factors that dictate how well a country converges with EU 
expectations and values. Much depends on the domestic politics and economic interests in the 
country. 44  The process of convergence occurs in a way that is uneven and specific to each 
country. This indicates the patchy impact of the EU on its neighbors, even in the core economic 
field.45 While the EU membership is an important incentive for ENP countries, the membership 
aspirations of the countries do not shape the outcome in the dimensions. Convergence to EU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rules can occur in countries even without EU aspirations and the adjustment costs and the range 
of mechanisms the EU uses.  Early analysis on the effectiveness of the ENP noted its limits as a 
pseudo enlargement policy, by comparing incentives and tools, more recent scholarship takes a 
more nuanced approach looking at the EU’s toolbox more in depth, with specific mechanisms 
examined for how well they bring results in ENP countries.  Langbein looks at how state and 
non-state actors are involved in the process of convergence and takes each country industry by 
industry to explain how or why changes occur. In the case of Ukraine, the country’s strategy 
towards EU convergence is summed up as  ‘maximizing commitments to maximize benefits’ 
with ‘benefits’ including securing the membership perspective and promoting convergence as a 
template for modernization.  
A sustained and stable progress of convergence is difficult given all the moving parts 
both within the country trying to make changes and within the EU and its limited to nonexistent 
monitoring activities.  In cases of strong domestic opposition, the EU mechanisms of reform 
make some impact, but do not lead to a sustained process of convergence. Rather than a ‘blanket’ 
change when ENP countries adopt and apply rules, there are more gradual forms of change that 
need to be noted. Ukraine’s membership aspirations play a key role in accounting for rule 
selection, justifying the perception of Ukraine as ‘most highly active’ in the ENP, but these 
aspirations recede when it comes to actually adopting EU rules. However effectively the EU can 
get ENP countries to adhere to its standards, scholars agree that without a concrete membership 
incentive, there needs to be widened possible access to the EU’s single market. 46  The 
Association Agreement negotiated with Ukraine was on the right path, but, again, the timing was 
off. Solid economic assistance didn’t come soon enough.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The ENP’s weaknesses also create a security vacuum, which can also widen to an 
economic one, which allows Russia to promote its agenda in what it sees as its chief foreign 
policy domain, an extension of its national interests and nearly a de-facto part of its own country. 
A relatively weak and incoherent ENP and EP, under the larger EU foreign policy umbrella 
hampers its relations with Russia and other Eastern non-member states and leaves an opening for 
challenges to its normative security agenda. To truly become an influential player, among 
Eastern non-member states, the EU needs to remedy its ENP and EP asymmetries and competing 
policy narratives and actually implement a coherent policy that achieves its objectives.  
The EU has largely failed to communicate and exercise a cohesive and coherent Common 
Security and Defense Policy with the ENP, and Russia has capitalized on it, often times being a 
“two-faced” partner.47 Russia’s lack of cooperation and realist attitude is most clearly being seen 
currently through the situation in Ukraine.  In pure realist fashion, Russia cooperates as an equal 
partner with the EU only when it directly benefits its own national interests. The majority of 
research done on the effectiveness of the ENP recognize significant shortfalls in the actual results 
yielded from the programs, and attempt to explain why EU peripheral states like Ukraine 
continue to struggle to adopt and enforce European normative values, and use these to propel the 
development of their infrastructure, economy and civil society to EU member state standards. 
The significant limitations of the ENP has weakened and further debilitated the EU’s CSDP 
overall, which critics say has “too little bottom-up and, at the same time, inconsistent top-down 
strategy.48 George Christou argues that this multilateral and somewhat inconsistent EP narrative 
was a direct product not just of the EU’s internal inability to form a “consensus on any ‘single’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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way but also due to the perception of a larger and more real security threat from Russia” in light 
of the Russia-Georgian war in 2008. 49 When EP policy is inconsistent, it threatens the whole 
EU’s security structure towards the East. In assessing the EU’s normative power and its security 
challenges post 1990, Ian Manners agrees, stating that, undoubtedly, the “promotion of 
normative principles through development policy had difficulties of coordination, 
complementarity, coherence, and consistency.”50 This is especially true when the EU typically 
cannot deliver the short-term help that Eastern Neighborhood countries need. The EU’s lack of a 
short-term option in incentivizing countries to modernize creates both an economic and security 
vacuum. When the EU’s limitations surface, Russia is right behind it, always extending one hand 
full of help along with another full of conditions tied to the help. 
A ring of well-governed countries in the Eastern periphery of the EU is crucial because 
for the EU,  “good governance is intrinsically linked to democracy and to the rule of law, which 
are major building blocks in ENP Action Plans.”51 To achieve this governance goal, the EU 
needs a broader, regional approach to reach its security objectives. The case of Ukraine shows 
that policies specifically geared towards individual partners have been disjointed and ultimately 
unsuccessful in meeting its objectives. Christou, Manners, Garwich and others are right to in 
attribute this to the paradox of the ENP’s inconsistent double narrative approach and inability to 
deliver on tangible goods. Even when potential Eastern Neighborhood member states disagree 
with the principles that are tied to Russian help, those ideological differences fall the wayside 
when it coms to signing actual trade and security cooperation agreements. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Why did Viktor Yanukovych reject the EU? Two Competing Theories.  
I now turn to providing evidence for my explanation of Yanukovych’s decision to reject 
the EU’s Association Agreement. In this section, I argue that it was the urgency of Ukraine’s 
economic situation that tipped the scales, in combination with the corruption of Yanukovych and 
his cronies and their ties to Putin and Russia.  I show why this explanation is better at explaining 
Yanukovych’s course of action than alternative ones. 
 
First Theory: Yanukovych in the EU-Ukraine-Russian tug of war  
 The key to why Yanukovych acted as he did in pivoting away from Europe lies in the 
speeches, negotiations and agreements over the last few years as he has danced between close 
ties with Russia and articulating his European aspirations. As Yanukovych talked, Ukraine’s 
economy has spiraled downward and contracted, in part due to rampant theft of state resources. 
And all the while, Ukraine continues to be beholden to Putin’s Russia and the natural gas they 
control and price. These three factors have escalated slowly throughout the last few years, 
culminating with the Yanukovych EU spurn in November 2014.  
 Yanukovych clearly operates in a classically realist mindset; he firstly seeks to maintain 
and increase his executive power and do whatever he can to stave off national bankruptcy, yet 
keep the status quo of political pilfering he and his family have been engaged in for years. He 
likely wants Ukraine to make more money, so long as he can keep siphoning a large chunk of the 
profits of it off the top, or the middle, or bottom… For him the Kiev-Moscow-Brussels triangle is 
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a zero-sum game. He was thinking in the short-term only, but realized you need to survive the 
short term to make it to the long term. There is a discrepancy between this realist Yanukovych 
timeframe and the liberal, long term functioning of the EU, and this played a significant role in 
Yanukovych’s decision to walk away from the deal. Ukraine remains vulnerable to Russia in a 
myriad of ways, one of which is the accessibility and pace of Russia’s decision making and 
action regarding Ukraine. The money, or the lack thereof, surrounding the Association 
Agreement illustrates this. Need a billion dollar loan bailout? Russia can authorize and send that 
over in days. The EU is still deciding and negotiating on whether it’s feasible. For the EU, its 
arguably greatest strength, its democratic normative values among its members and prospective 
member states, is also it biggest hindrance. The bureaucratic and convoluted processes that direct 
the way the EU functions and the organization and hierarchy of its institutions neuter it, in a 
sense, from making impactful decisions in its neighborhood. This lag essentially puts the EU’s 
entire foreign policy at risk, making it perennially two steps behind others, namely Russia, who 
with its more authoritarian, unilateral approach can streamline its decisions and actions. If 
membership is the EU’s biggest carrot on the international stage, its single market and economic 
fortitude is likely second. But as its own economy suffers through the Euro crisis, high 
unemployment, and debt, how can it then efficiently incentives others to ally with it and posture 
itself as a provider of aid or loans. One could argue that the economic assistance, actions, is the 
first step in the door. If a country can benefit from an EU boost to their economy, they’re much 
more likely to develop EU values like the Copenhagen Criteria and more resolutely chase after 
membership. In the case of Ukraine especially, the EU is still trying to open that door, much less 
take a step through it.  
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Ukraine’s track record of cooperating with the EU’s CSDP shows that the country has 
been interested and committed to EU’s security approach for the area. Much of the country’s 
official attitudes towards the Eastern Partnership and Eastern Neighborhood Policy and Common 
Security and Defense Policy have been dependent upon which political party is in power at the 
time and holds the presidency.  Party politics, including those of its current president and the 
oligarch industry leaders have largely driven Ukraine’s attitude towards the EU. Clashes between 
domestic political factions, with the more nationalistic, European West and Russian-allied East 
have traditionally complicated the country’s public opinion on the EU and continue to do so 
through the government protests that started in late 2014. In the years leading up to the 
Association Agreement deadline, Ukraine has actively taken part in its foreign policy missions. It 
is involved in the EU Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and also the ATALANTA mission 
combatting piracy off the coast of Somalia.52 Ukraine has closely allied its security platforms and 
priorities with EU Common Security and Defense Policy.53 Ukraine signed a Permanent Security 
Agreement with the EU in 2005, it signed another agreement in 2008 and according to a 2010 
Ukrainian Cabinet report, the administration at that time had self-reported allegiance to nearly all 
EU security positions.54  It also signaled it was on board with EU democratic governance through 
progress on children’s rights, the establishment of a gender-equality commission, and the 
adoption of a package of anti-corruption laws.55 The election of Yanukovych in 2010 saw a 
correlating shift in the country’s attitude and actions toward Europe. Upon his election, judicial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Zarembo, 2011, pg 2 Zarembo, K. (2011). Ukraine in EU Security: An Undervalued Partner. Policy Brief (88) FRIDE A 
European Think Tank for Global Action 
 
53 Zarembo, 2011, pg 2 
 
54 European Commission. 2010 May 5. European Commission. (2010 May 5). Implementation of the European Neighborhood 





and freedom of expression reforms slowed and Ukraine was aligned to only 26 out of 44 CFSP 
statements, significantly less than in the past.56  
 Despite its slow-moving processes, the EU has been proactive and clear in its relations 
with Ukraine, and the Association Agreement debacle shows this. Joint statements between the 
EU and Ukraine over the last several years and the Ukraine’s initialing of the documents and 
willingness, in words only, to reform appears to indicate a desire on some level to work with the 
EU. But the very nature of what the EU, a slow-moving machine of many parts nullifies any kind 
of swift action.  The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA agreement represented 
the ‘most ambitious and complex agreements the European Union has ever negotiated with a 
third country’ said Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood 
Policy at a cooperation meeting in 2012.57 The EU had already helped Ukraine significantly in 
being admitted to the World Trade Organization, and this agreement then indicated and 
expressed a hope that membership could have followed for Ukraine, if it modernizes its 
economy, reforms its judicial and civic infrastructure and cleanses state institutions of rampant 
corruption.58 Critics may fault the EU for emphasizing and holding tight on the Association 
Agreement’s demands of Ukraine and imposing tougher entry terms for a free trade union, but 
these conditions are the only teeth the EU has when it comes to it’s Eastern Partnership policy. 
They are necessary if the Ukraine hopes to improve its economy, infrastructure and civil society 
in the future, and make it qualified for EU membership. The failure of the EU to get Ukraine to 
sign the Association Agreement reflects poorly on the merits of the policy itself, especially 
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considering how Ukraine was heralded as the “most promising case” for democratization through 
the ENP in past years.59 
 
Russia’s Asserts Its Interests  
But as the EU spent years negotiating with Ukraine on the deal, Russia continued to 
further assert its own agenda as a EU alternative. And Brussels was largely unprepared for this.60  
Former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who directly worked with Ukrainian leaders 
on crafting the Association Agreement, said the EU underestimated the country’s ideological 
divide towards the EU and Russia’s role in Ukraine’s attitude towards the deal. “…Brussels was 
naïve. From Putin's perspective, Ukraine is an important factor, perhaps the most important one 
of all. He cannot achieve his goal of creating his own Euro-Asian union without Ukraine. This is 
nearly verified by the leaking of a draft of a Russian plan to thwart the signing of Association 
Agreement by Ukraine. The paper lays out a plan for preventing Ukraine from signing an EU 
Association Agreement, creating an "influential network" of pro-Russian organizations capable 
of preventing the government from "undertaking actions that are not beneficial for Russia," and 
bringing Ukraine into the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union and Single Economic Space by 
2015.61 The immediate objectives of the paper are as follows: 
“1. Preventing the signing of agreements between Ukraine and the EU on the 
Association. 
2. Formation of an influential network of pro-Russian political forces capable of 
Ukrainian authorities to restrain from adverse action for Russia, as well as forcing them 
to Ukraine joining the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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3. Neutralization of the political and media influence weakening. 
4. Creating conditions for Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space 2015.”62 
 
It also highlights specifics of how joining the Customs Union instead will mean big gains for 
Ukraine’s economy. The Custom’s Union would create and expand opportunities for high-tech 
industries “created as part of a single economic complex of the USSR.”  Ukraine’s participation 
will ensure the co-dependency of it on the Russian market of engineering, agriculture, chemical 
and metallurgical complexes that form the basis of the Ukrainian economy, and will bring 
stability and increase GDP will increase by 15-18% in the medium term.63 
The very nature of the EU, the way it was built and works, limits its capabilities when 
responding to crises. This also contributes to a “silo effect” within its bureaucracy and 
contributed to its miscalculation on the Russian agenda. In the months following the fallout from 
Ukraine’s Association Agreement rejection, diplomats reflected that so much bureaucratic 
energy had been invested in brining the country into the ENP, that “wishful thinking prevailed 
over hardheaded calculation.”64 
When Stefan Fule visited Kiev in November 2013 a few weeks before the signing 
conference in Vilnius, he reportedly told EU officials that Yanukovych was having second 
thoughts about the agreement, noting that Russian restrictions on trade would may have 
decreased Ukrainian industrial output by 40 percent. Fule noted this privately, but in public 
statements, the EU only heralded Yanukovych’s commitment to democratic values.65 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Linus Linkevicius said Yanukovych sent so many 
mixed signals that it was “impossible to know what he intended to do.” Sweden’s foreign 
minister, Carl Bildt, made similar comments. “…. We have seen a different Russia emerging in 
the last year in particular that many anticipated.” Bildt says that the EU did two things wrong in 
retrospect: not taking seriously Russian military doctrine claims since 2009 that it had the right 
to protect Russian speakers outside its own borders, especially in former Soviet lands, and when 
Russia started to block the import of Ukrainian goods when Ukraine moved towards a deal with 
Brussels.66 Another senior diplomat quoted anonymously by The New York Times said that 
Europe “stumbled badly by reducing its outreach to Ukraine to a ‘technocratic and bloodless’ 
exercise that ignored political realities” and added most member states have completely ignored 
the hard power political dimensions of dealing with Russia. 
The West underestimates Russia's determination, and it also underestimated the political 
and economic situation in Kiev that drove Yanukovych’s decisions on the agreement.”67 Western 
observers largely agree. Bruce Jackson, the president of the Project on Transitional Democracies, 
an American nonprofit group that has concentrated on Eastern Europe. “Russia did a much better 
job of explaining pocketbook issues in a very forceful way than Europe did in explaining abstract 
political benefits … Russia wanted this more than we did, certainly more than America did; we 
didn’t even show up.” 68 69 Russia has postured its Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus 
as an ideological contrast and economic foil in opposition to the EU and all that it stands for. 
Rather than imposing any immediate conditions, because it doesn’t want Ukraine to modernize, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66!Ibid!
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lest it moves out from under Moscow’s thumb. Russia has emphasized the short-term benefits of 
joining their trade union, namely lowered gas prices and potential loans from Russia. Russia, 
which is Ukraine’s biggest trading partner, argued that economic integration with the EU would 
lead to a flood of cheap EU goods, further fuel inflation and hurt Ukrainian produces and 
Russian products by extension.  Russia has essentially blackmailed Ukraine as the country 
moved towards a decision on the EU agreement, threatening higher gas prices, tariffs and trade 
sanctions. 70 In the wake of Yanukovych’s about-face on the Association Agreement, Ukraine 
will continue to be a quickly sinking disenfranchised state, billions of dollars in debt, with more 
and more young and educated people leaving the country each year. EU leaders may lament 
Yanukovych’s response to their Association Agreement, but critics argued that Russia offered a 
better deal, with promises for a major loan, increased trans-national trade and lower gas prices.71  
Unlike the EU, when Russia threatens, it follows through. In August 2013, months before 
the Vilnius meeting with Russia launched a 6-day trade embargo of Ukrainian goods from 50 
Ukrainian companies, stopping them at the Russian border through intensive checks by 
customs.72 At the time, several Russian officials said that embargo was a precursor to a total 
freeze out in trade if it were to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Comments by 
Sergei Glaziev, Putin's adviser on economy, confirms this: “By signing the AA (Association 
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Agreement), Ukraine loses independence and ceases to be not just a strategic, but even a full-
value partner (for Russia),” Glaziev said.73 
It has long been known by the international community that Russia’s foreign policy 
aspirations include a hand in Ukraine. Many scholars agree that the country is the most important 
in Russia’s sphere of influence, without it, Russia cannot be on top in Eastern Europe.74  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, noted that ‘without Ukraine, Russia 
ceases to be a Eurasian empire’ (Oleyrchyk, 2011). 75 Russia’s control over Yanukovych is clear 
in the account from former Polish prime minister Radoslaw Sikorski from February 2014, after 
protests in Kiev forced the president to work through a truce with the opposition to call early 
elections in 2014. 
“He was fighting hard to preserve whatever he could and yield the least,” said Sikorski, 
the foreign minister of Poland, who spent hours with Mr. Yanukovych as part of a team of 
European diplomats who mediated the accord. 
“Mr. Sikorski said he told Mr. Yanukovych that the only way to sell a deal to the 
opposition was to specify when a new presidential election would be held. “You 
need to declare on what date you’ll resign,” he said he told the president. Mr. 
Yanukovych “went white,” Mr. Sikorski said. But the deadlock lifted after the 
Ukrainian leader received a phone call shortly afterward from President 
Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. “He came back, he was agreeing to limit his time in 
office,” Sikorski said.”76 
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Second Theory: Yanukovych Never Intended to Sign the EU Agreement  
As Ukraine continues to cope with the Association Agreement rejection, many pro-EU 
Ukrainians have turned to alternate theories to explain Yanukovych’s about face. These theories 
include the belief that Yanukovych never intended to sign the EU Agreement and his years of 
negotiations were an act, while he continued to plunder the national treasury. This is an 
especially popular theory among young Ukrainians who are eager for a compete change in 
political elites. Many Ukrainians in Lviv, in the pro-European West, protested at EuroMaidan in 
Kiev often out of anger and frustration with the cozy Yanukovych-Putin relationship and 
corruption rather than a strong desire to join the EU. Young people support the EU want their 
country to someday be a part of it, but recognize progress must be made first.  
 “EU it is not paradise for Ukraine, it is hard world of market economy and competition 
where Ukraine haven't experience, but we need the EU, because it is modern and progressive 
world, and Russia it is degradation from past times,” said Sergiy Olynik, a graduate student in 
Kiev.  
“The association with the EU for Ukraine is a necessity. We need to destroy the system 
of corruption and strengthen democracy,” said Lesya Bilyk, a student at Ukrainian Catholic 
University in Lviv, who spent several days protesting in Kiev. “It's important for our economy, 
education, for everything.” 
Many believe that Yanukovych never intended to sign the EU accord in the first place, “I 
think his decisions are directed by the influence of our Eastern neighbor. I don't think he was 
really looking towards the trade agreement with the EU,” said Nazariy Fedyshyn, a seminarian 
student at Lviv Holy Spirit Seminary of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. 
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“He wasn`t going to sign up the EU contract from the very beginning. It`s just a game. 
Moreover it seems that he doesn't really control the country. He is like a doll,” said Oleg 
Klymonchuk, a seminary student in Kiev. 
One popular opinion is that Yanukovych was an opportunist hoping to get money 
wherever he could, said Mariana Shchetyna, a university professor in Lviv. “He just wanted to 
receive money and didn't really care from whom - EU or Russia. Other people say that all of this 
is carefully planned by Putin in his attempt to divide Ukraine and create a new version of the 
USSR.” 
 Other theories that might explain Yanukovych’s trajectory and his cost-benefit analysis 
that ultimately led to his pivot away from Europe, do not take into consideration the complexity 
of the chain of events leading to his decision and Russia’s heavy hand in influencing him. Some 
Ukrainians say that Yanukovych never intended to sign the Association Agreement to begin with 
and doubt any and all comments he’s made pledging closer ties and expressing a desire to be 
considered possible members of the EU. But in the two years leading up to the Vilnius summit, 
he welcomed European Parliament monitors into Ukraine. Both parties have reiterated 
commitments to a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and agree to a loan of 
610 million Euros from the IMF.77  
He initialed a draft of the plan months before the signing meeting in Vilnius. Why go 
through all the trouble to initial and the draft if it was always never going to be signed? The 
paper trail from the EU Association Agreement and signed treaties between the EU and Ukraine 
in the past suggest that there were intentions to follow through at the time the agreement was 
being negotiated. 
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77  Yanukovych, V.(2013,February). 16th ukraine-eu summit. Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_02_25_1_en.htm 
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If the theory that Yanukovych never intended to sign the Association Agreement to begin 
with, an important question would have to be asked for which there are no easy answers.  Why 
would he, then, spend so much time and effort negotiating and initially approving a trade deal 
that he knew would never come into effect? And why bother allying with the Europeans on other 
key security issues and initiatives, potentially jeopardizing its relationship with Russia, his 
biggest ally? All of Yanukovych’s speeches, and the motivations articulated by his staff during 
negotiations in Brussels indicate a willingness to not only cooperate and collaborate with the EU, 
but someday may be key part of it. In a speech to the European Parliament in September 2013, 
just two months before he refused to sign the final trade deal, Yanukovych emphasized his 
country’s commitment to legal reform and progress and said the deal is necessary despite any 
opposition. “This is the homework Ukraine's parliament has to complete before the Vilnius 
summit to enable Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement,” the president said during his address to parliament, which reconvened 
after a summer recess on Sept. 3. “The association is not needed for the authorities or the 
opposition, it's needed for Ukraine.” It’s unlikely these comments are outright lies, but that, at 
the previous theory stated, his turnaround was the result of a varying mix of factors coming 
together. In the same speech Yanukovych delivered to the Council of Europe in 2011, he said his 
biggest foreign policy goal was improving Ukrainian relations with Russia and taking them “to a 
new level” while also emphasizing a priority of European integration.78 Yanukovych outlined 
domestic reforms already underway, including legal reform, constitutional reform and judicial 
reform. It’s unclear whether any of those reforms were actually under development. He also 
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78 Address by Viktor Yanukovych, President of Ukraine on the occasion of the third part of the 2011 ordinary session of the 
council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. (2011, June 20). Retrieved from http://hub.coe.int/speech-yanukovych 
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condemned corruption and promised legislation to curb it.79 But he also said “his efforts had 
experienced opposition from individuals who had become rich as a result of embezzling public 
funds.”80 
Maybe he never intended to sign the agreement, but it seems unlikely given the efforts he 
had gone through in the past. It is more likely that he intended to sign it, hoping to get the best of 
both worlds for Ukraine from both Russia and the EU. Yanukovych believed Ukraine would 
receive short-term, financial benefits, in a massive loan and cuts in gas prices by joining the 
Russian-led Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. But yet he continued the course 
towards European integration, and even initialed a draft Agreement with the EU on a free trade 
area (FTA), the signing of which was scheduled for November of 2013. After that Ukraine's 




As Ukraine continues to find its way towards a new government and a new path forward, 
it is clear the Russians will still try to exert their influence. Their major ally may be ousted but 
the pressure will be on the next president and the economic realities of an economy on the brink !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




 81!Third Theory: Geopolitical Divides in Ukraine Drove Yanukovych to Reject the EU  
Another competing theory that has gained more traction as Yanukovych has fled to his eastern home base is that he didn’t sign 
the Association Agreement because of the EU requirements and did not want to risk a deeper chasm in Ukraine between the East 
and West. Although divisions and tensions between the more Western-looking West and the East, dominated by ethnic Russians 
and Russian speakers have always existed, the split was not on the precipice of a civil war as it looked in late February 2014 
when Yanukovych’s own Party of Regions allies turned against him after state police to killed protestors. It’s a stretch, with little 
evidence to suggest that a protest in Eastern Ukraine would have occurred like the one in Kiev if Yanukovych had signed the deal 
and further integrated economically with Europe. There are far too many moving parts and the economic and Russian factor are 
too significant to discount it as the driving region behind Yanukovych.  !
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of bankruptcy has the potential to leave Ukraine vulnerable once again, if the EU cannot remedy 
the time discrepancy in their reactions and plans and find a more effective way to influence and 
incentivize Eastern countries towards their normative democratic policies. This thesis argues that 
there are structural and institutional obstacles that face the EU in incentivizing Eastern European 
countries to conform to its democratic policies and reform domestic institutions. Yanukovych 
ultimately rejected the Association Agreement with the EU because of political pressure from 
Russia and economic desperation for quick money to avoid bankruptcy. Research and analysis 
from political observers of Russia’s geopolitical agenda, along with statements, government and 
news reports provide evidence to support this combination of factors that ultimately led to 
Yanukovych’s rejection. The evidence, most notably, the duration of time Yanukovych took in 
negotiating the AA with Brussels, does not suggest he never intended to sign it, nor that he was 
swayed by public opinion and/or is constituent support base in Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is 
shown to have much more influence over Ukraine’s crooked executive than the people that 
elected it.  
 With Yanukovych now ousted and in exile from his own country, Ukraine has another 
chance for a new start. It’s elections in May 2014 will indicate much about the way the new 
regime will work, and whether it will stay on a path towards Europeanization and 
democratization, reform and economic solvency. For this new government to be successful it 
must succeed in many large endeavors, most notably keeping the Russians from further annexing 
its territory, protecting and reestablishing the rights all Ukrainians, regardless of their ethnicity, 
what language they speak, or what their political preferences.  It already has a good start by re-
balancing federal authority between the legislative and executive branch. Time will tell whether 
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the elections can be the catalyst for a new, prosperous Ukraine with a new group of political 
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